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Abstract
Whenever a shared database resource, containing critical patient data, is created, protecting the contents of the database is a high
priority goal. This goal can be achieved by developing a Query-By-Example (QBE) interface, designed to access a shared database,
and embedding within the QBE a hierarchical security module that limits access to the data. The security module ensures that
researchers working in one clinic do not get access to data from another clinic. The security can be based on a ﬂexible taxonomy
structure that allows ordinary users to access data from individual clinics and super users to access data from all clinics [1]. All
researchers submit queries through the same interface and the security module processes the taxonomy and user identiﬁers to limit
access. Using this system, two diﬀerent users with diﬀerent access rights can submit the same query and get diﬀerent results thus
reducing the need to create diﬀerent interfaces for diﬀerent clinics and access rights.
 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Given the recent changes to medical information
protection policies, multi-clinic research initiatives must
use database resources that provide researchers with
enough ﬂexibility to analyze information while appro-
priately protecting information. In a multi-clinic re-
search environment, all database users may not be
authorized to view all information. Database adminis-
trators (DBA) developing information resources for
such initiatives have to maintain a balance between
database complexity for security and ease of use for
analysis. While it is easier to enforce security by devel-
oping separate databases for each individual clinic, it is
more diﬃcult for DBAs to manage extra databases.
Conversely, a single database is easier to manage but
introduces security issues. In this paper, I present a se-
curity module that allows DBAs to merge information
for patients from several clinics into one database while
controlling access to the information. This article de-
scribes a database infrastructure for multi-clinic re-
search initiatives in which there are several data sources
shared by the clinics, i.e,, hospital lab data, and gene
expression results, and individual data sources unique to
individual clinics.
As an example, clinicians from 10 diﬀerent clinics at
the Johns Hopkins Medical Institution are participating
in a shared pulmonary genomics grant. The main goal of
the project is to identify genes that may play a role in
several pulmonary complications. RNA samples will be
collected from various specimens and microarray data
will be generated. To facilitate biostatistical analysis and
other bioinformatics agendas, a central database has
been created to store the data that is generated from the
microarrays. Several of the clinics have small pre-exist-
ing databases that were created to store information
gathered from patients that have visited the clinics. The
individual databases will be merged into a single data-
base. In addition to clinic speciﬁc data, laboratory data
will be stored in the shared database resource.
Fig. 1 illustrates the design goals of the shared da-
tabase. The data will be partitioned into several sche-
mas. The information from microarrays will be stored in
one schema. The microarray schema will contain data
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for all clinics and the data will be marked with identiﬁers
unique to clinics and patients within the clinics. The
laboratory data will be stored in a separate schema and
identiﬁed similarly. The databases managed by the in-
dividual clinics vary in structure and content. To retain
familiarity for individual clinicians, the database struc-
tures for individual clinics within the shared resource
will be mimicked. This shared database resource will be
the central location for all informatics activities for the
research grant.
2. Accessing data
This shared database resource will be used by a va-
riety of individuals from graduate students, and fellows
to clinicians and biostatisticians. To simplify the task of
browsing the database, a Query-By-Example (QBE) in-
terface has been developed [2]. A QBE interface hides
the details of generating queries and allows users to
focus on the content of queries. Fig. 2 illustrates the
QBE interface. The interface contains a schema tree and
two boxes, a projection box and a selection box. The
schema tree lists the database sections and tables within
the sections that the user has access to. The QBE in-
terface presents to the user a list of columns under each
table in the schema tree. The column ‘‘str_Mutation1’’
will appear under the ‘‘cf_diagnosis’’ table in the schema
tree. The projection box is used to list the columns that
should be extracted when the query is evaluated. For
example, CF.cf_diagnosis.str_Mutation1 represents the
‘‘str_Mutation1’’ column of the ‘‘cf_diagnosis’’ table in
the ‘‘CF’’ clinic schema of the database. Finally, the
selection box is used to list the constraints of the query.
The constraint ‘‘pga_common.demographics.PatientID
<34’’ is a constraint on the ‘‘PatientID’’ column of the
‘‘demographics’’ table in the ‘‘pga_common’’ schema
that limits results to those patients having PatientIDs
less than 34. The selection box will contain all of the
constraints on patients and patient data that can ﬁlter
the database. The QBE interface is a powerful database
tool that provides users with the ﬂexibility to freely ex-
press queries without knowledge of the underlying table
structures.
The QBE interface is used to control access to the
shared database. Users are granted direct access to the
QBE interface and not direct access to the RDBMS.
Therefore, there is one account in the RDBMS that the
QBE interface will use while there are several accounts
Fig. 1. Database integration of several sources of information into a
shared database resource.
Fig. 2. The QBE interface allows users to build queries by copying columns from the Schema Box to the Projection Box and Selection Box. The
Schema Box lists tables such as pga_common.demographics and CF.cf_diagnosis and columns such as HistoryNo, Name, and str_Mutation1 that
are available to the users. The Projection Box lists those columns that are of interest and will be returned as the result of executing a query. The
Selection Box lists those columns and constraints that will be used to restrict the database to records of interest. In the above example, the QBE
interface is used to create a query in which the CF Diagnosis Mutations 1 and 2, History Number, Patient ID, etc. will be reported for all patients
whose Patient ID is less than 34.
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in the QBE interface that the users will use. This ar-
rangement has the advantage that security measures can
be implemented in the QBE interface since all data is
accessed through the QBE interface. No user will have
an account on the RDBMS and thus cannot bypass the
security the QBE security measures. Provided that the
RDBMS does not allow users to access data without
valid accounts, the QBE interface can be used to control
access to data as long as the account that is used by the
QBE to access the RDBMS is not available to the users.
An integral component of any QBE interface is the
set of expressions that denote the join conditions for
tables in a database. The database administrator typi-
cally creates these expressions and they reﬂect database
design knowledge that the average user may not have
access to or need to know. For every connected set of
tables in a schema, the database administrator generates
a set of join conditions such that there is a path from
every table to every other table in the same connected
set.
The QBE interface constructs SQL queries from the
contents of the projection and selection boxes. The in-
terface will ﬁrst identify the set of unique tables refer-
ence in the projection and selection boxes. This set is
used in the FROM clause of an SQL statement. The
SELECT clause is composed on entries in the projection
box. The WHERE clause is composed of the set of
conditions in the selection box and the set of pre-deﬁned
expressions that denote the join conditions for tables in
the FROM clause. For example, assume that a user
selects the ‘‘TestName’’ and the ‘‘Value’’ columns from
a ‘‘LabTests’’ table and adds them to the projection box.
Additionally, assume that the user places a restriction on
the ‘‘PatientNumber’’ of the ‘‘Demographics’’ table,
such as entering patient number ¼ 6857. Finally, as-
sume that the database administrator has created the
following link between the ‘‘LabTests’’ and ‘‘Demo-
graphics’’ table:
LabTests:PatientId ¼ Demographics:PatientId:
The QBE interface will generate the following SQL
statement from the contents of the projection and the
selection boxes:
SELECT T:TestName;T:Value
FROM LabTests T;Demographics D
WHERE D:PatientNumber ¼ 6857 AND T:PatientId
¼ D:Patientid:
A generic QBE interface will give users access to all
data. While it is desirable to give all users access to the
database, in a shared database resource, it is also de-
sirable to limit access to patient data based on the access
privileges of the user. Users of the database will have
diﬀerent access rights. For example, graduate students
and fellows working for the CF clinic should only have
access to data for patients of the CF clinic. This policy
can be easily implemented by limiting the QBE interface
to the CF schema. However, the shared areas of the
database, namely the laboratory schema and the mi-
croarray schema, contain data for all clinics. Members
of the CF clinic will have to access these areas to collect
all information on patients in the CF clinic. The goal is
to grant access to the shared areas while limiting access
to data for those patients in the CF clinic.
The security module that is implemented in the QBE
interface described above has to be ﬂexible since all
database users will use the QBE interface to browse the
database. Graduate students and fellows will be granted
basic access to extract all data for patients in a particular
clinic. Biostatisticians will have more extensive access to
data for all patients in all clinics. Project administrators
will also have extensive access to data from all clinics.
The QBE interface has to allow all types of users to
access the database while protecting certain areas data
from users that do not access rights.
3. Taxonomy
A taxonomy is a multi-layered grouping of concepts
that are typically structured like trees, although many
taxonomies are not pure trees. The most speciﬁc con-
cepts are located at the bottom of the taxonomy and the
most general concepts are located at the top. The con-
cepts, above the bottom layer, are often strategically
grouped according to a set of characteristics that they
share. Concepts can be grouped by function, i.e., Beta-
Blockers, locality, i.e., NorthEast, and many other
properties.
Fig. 3 illustrates a taxonomy deﬁned over patients
and some of the clinics participating in the shared re-
search grant. The taxonomy highlights the partitioning
of patients in the various research projects. Patients 11,
12, and 13 are all patients of the Cystic Fibrosis clinic.
Similarly, patients 21,22, and 23 are patients of the
COPD clinic. Taxonomies are often used to express
subsumption and to support aggregation. For example,
the Asthma clinic subsumes patients 31, 32, and 33. All
Fig. 3. Patient and clinic taxonomy illustrating the groupings of pa-
tients in to clinics and the aggregation of clinics in to a research unit.
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calculations on the Asthma clinic will represent aggre-
gations over patients 31, 32, and 33. Using the taxon-
omy in Fig. 3, an institution can create a computer
information system that will allow researchers to ex-
plicitly specify the COPD clinic and automatically ex-
pand the speciﬁcation to the patients subsumed by the
COPD clinic [3]. The subsumption and aggregation
properties of taxonomies can be exploited to create a
ﬂexible security module for the QBE interface previously
mentioned.
4. Hierarchical security
The goal of the security module is to control access
to patient data based on the access rights of the users.
The security model is based on role based access con-
trol (RBAC) [4]. The RBAC model is used to limit
access to system resources based on roles deﬁned in the
system. A role is a set of actions that can be per-
formed. Users are assigned to roles and thus inherit the
privileges of the roles. Most commercial RDBMS oﬀer
RBAC security on objects such as tables, views, and
procedures. These RBAC features do not control ac-
cess to individual rows in a table, ie individual patient
records. In a shared database repository, row level
RBAC security is needed. The RBAC is discussed in
further detail in [5–7]. In this article, roles will be
limited to ‘‘read’’ access. Consider Fig. 3, researchers in
the CF clinic should have access to all data from the
CF clinic but not have access to data from other
clinics. We can use the subsumption characteristics of
taxonomies to implement a security module based on
this restriction. Assume that researcher Ra has access
to data for patients in the CF clinic. This access priv-
ilege can be denoted as:
Ra! CF ðF1Þ
Furthermore, from Fig. 3 we can state:
CF! 11; CF! 12; and CF! 13 ðF2Þ
Therefore, through transitivity, we can conclude:
Ra! 11; Ra! 12; and Ra! 13 ðF3Þ
If researcher Ra uses the QBE interface to create a query
for the database, the QBE interface can automatically
augment the query with information from (F3). The
information in (F3) is the logical deduction of the pa-
tient identiﬁers that researcher Ra can access. Therefore,
the QBE interface can augment any query generated by
Ra to restrict patients to those patients with identiﬁers
11, 12, and 13. Given (F3), we can deﬁne a function
TransitiveAccess(Act) that calculates the set of patient
identiﬁers that a user with account Act can access. For
example, from (F3):
TransitiveAccessðRaÞ ¼ f11; 12; 13g:
Furthermore, consider the biostatistician, Ba, who has
access at the HopGene level. From Fig. 3:
TransitiveAccessðBaÞ ¼ f11; 12; 13; 21; 22; 23; 31;
32; 33; 41; 42; 43g:
The TransitiveAccess sets of user Ra and Ba reveal that
the biostatistician Ba has more access to the database
than researcher Ra. This example highlights how a
ﬂexible hierarchical security module can be implemented
using a taxonomy structure. The TransitiveAccess
function is formerly known as the transitive closure. The
transitive closure is often used in knowledge represen-
tation systems and is easy to compute. It can be per-
formed in less than one second for taxonomies that are
10+ levels deep containing many nodes as demonstrated
in [8].
This hierarchical security module is implemented in
conjunction with a database that has a translation table
that maps internal patient identiﬁers to clinic speciﬁc
patient identiﬁers. Every patient record in the clinic
speciﬁc schemas is tagged with a unique patient identiﬁer
deﬁned by the clinic. Every table in the shared schemas
will have a ‘‘PatientId’’ column. This ‘‘PatientId’’ is a
unique identiﬁer for every patient that will be entered
into the shared database. For example, the information
for patient 11 in the CF clinic will have the value 11 for
every ‘‘PatientId’’ column in tables of the shared schema
containing information for this patient although the
identiﬁer in the CF clinic for this patient may actually be
some other value. The translation table will contain the
information that is needed to map from the clinic iden-
tiﬁer to the research database identiﬁer. The translation
table is the link between the QBE interface, the database,
and the hierarchical security module.
The QBE interface can implement the hierarchical
security module with two simple procedures. First, the
QBE interface has to ensure that the translation table is
included in all queries generated by the users. Second,
the QBE interface has to add the TransitiveAccess()
function to the queries. This addition can be expressed
as a relational join between the ‘‘PatientId’’ of the
translation table and the results of TransitiveAccess()
function. It is important to note that the security logic is
implemented in the taxonomy and not the QBE inter-
face. Therefore, two users with diﬀerent access rights can
submit the same query and the QBE interface will gen-
erate the same SQL statement for both users, although
the account numbers supplied to the TransitiveAccess
function will diﬀer.
The process of limiting access to individual patient
records is as follows:
1. The use generates an SQL query with the QBE
interface.
2. The QBE interface adds the translation table to the
query.
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3. The QBE interface adds the TrnasitiveAccess()
functions to the query.
4. The QBE interface submits the SQL query to the
RDBMS.
Tables 1 and 2 contain examples of designs that are
compatible with the hierarchical security module. As-
sume that researcher Ra used the QBE interface to ex-
tract the ‘‘TestName’’ and ‘‘Value’’ columns from the
LabTests table. The QBE interface will generate the
SQL statement:
SELECT A:TestName;A:Value FROM LabTests A
ðQ1Þ
To implement the hierarchical security, the QBE inter-
face will have to join the ‘‘Translation’’ table to Q1
generating the following SQL statement:
SELECTA:TestName;A:ValueFROMLabTestsA;
Translation T
WHERE T:PatientId ¼ A:PatientId ðQ2Þ
Finally, the QBE interface will join Q2 with the results
of TransitiveAccess(Ra):
SELECTA:TestName; A:Value FROM LabTests A;
Translation T;
ðSelect SubClass as PatientId FROM Taxonomy
CONNECT BY PRIOR SuperClass
¼ SubClass START WITH SuperClass ¼ RaÞ H
WHERE T:PatientId ¼ A:PatientId AND T:PatientId
¼ H:PatientId ðQ3Þ
The statement in (Q3) assumes that the Oracle 8i
RDBMS is used. Implementing the hierarchical security
module in other RDBMSs will require a function that
returns 1 (TRUE) or 0 (FALSE) if Ra is allowed access
data for a particular patient. Call this function In-
TransitiveAccess(Acct, PatId). InTransitiveAccess(Acct,
PatId) ¼ 1, if PatId is in the set TransitiveAccess(Acct)
and 0 otherwise. Given this function, the QBE interface
can generate a query similar to the following:
SELECT A:TestName;A:Value FROM LabTests A;
Translation T
WHERE T:PatientId ¼ A:PatientId AND InTransitive
Access ðRa; T:PatientIdÞ ¼ 1 ðQ4Þ
Executing this query for the researcher Ra will yield
the results in Table 3a. On the other hand, executing this
query for the biostatistician Ba, changing Ra to Ba, will
yield the results in Table 3b.
The query results vary because the biostatistician Ba
has more access to the database than the researcher Ra.
This example illustrates the potential of this hierarchical
security module. The module co-exists seamlessly with
the QBE interface and consequently, the SQL state-
ments that the QBE interface generates.
DBAs can use alternative database designs to imple-
ment security. Separate databases can be created to ac-
commodate diﬀerent access privileges. A separate
database can be created for each clinic and the appro-
priate access rights can be granted to each database. For
super users, a single replica database can be created that
contains all the information. This approach is not ﬂex-
ible enough because a DBA will have to create separate
databases for every group of patients. Consider the
scenario where one clinic is conducting two trials. Some
patients have signed consent forms for trial A while
some have signed consent forms for trial B. Also assume
that some patients have given consent for both trials.
Researchers working on trial A should not have access
to data for those patients in trial B. The DBA would
have to create separate databases for the diﬀerent sce-
narios. With a QBE interface and the hierarchical se-
curity module describe above, the DBA would have to
create two clinical trial groups in the taxonomy and
Table 1
Translation of patient hospital/medical number to internal patient
identiﬁers
PatientId ClinicId PatientNumber
11 1 6572
12 1 5678
23 2 1234
31 3 6785
Table 2
Sample lab test results stored in a shared database resource
PatientId TestName Value
11 PFT 6.7
12 PFT 4.5
23 FEV 8.1
31 FEV 5.8
The test results are annotated with internal patient identiﬁers as
opposed to actual medical record numbers.
Table 3
Query results for two diﬀerent users executing query Q4 (select all lab
tests results for patients for which the user has access)
3a: Q4 results for
researcher Ra
3b: Q4 results for biostatistician
Ba
PFT PFT
6.7 6.7
PFT PFT
4.5 4.5
FEV
8.1
FEV
5.8
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patients to the groups accordingly. Users will then be
granted access to the clinical trial group. This can all be
performed without creating separate databases and
developing the routines needed to keep the separate
databases synchronized.
Database administrators can also use the RBAC se-
curity that is implemented in commercial databases to
protect information on a per patient basis. The RBAC
that is implemented will protect all data in a given table
but cannot be used to protect individual records in a
table. To use the RBAC features in commercial
RDBMS, DBAs will have to create separate tables for
each patient and grant permissions according to access
structures. This approach is extremely diﬃcult to man-
age and ineﬃcient. Users that request information from
more than one patient will have complicated SQL ex-
pressions that merge data from diﬀerent tables. This
approach is both diﬃcult maintain for DBAs and diﬃ-
cult to query for users. A QBE interface with the hier-
archical security module built in is easier for the users
and does not require that DBAs make major changes to
existing database schemas.
The hierarchical security module can be used to im-
plement a myriad of security structures [9]. The database
administrator can grant access to individual patients by
creating links in the taxonomy from the patients clinic
identiﬁers to the internal database identiﬁers. For exam-
ple, John Doe could use the QBE interface to browse in-
formation if the taxonomy contained a link from 6572,
Johns clinic identiﬁer, to 11. Executing query (Q4) for
JohnDoe, i.e., replacingRawith 6572, will yield the single
row {PFT,6.7} since JohnDoe only has access to his data.
Furthermore, the database administrator could create
inter-clinic groups. If two patients from the CF clinic, 11
and 12, and twopatients from theCOPDclinic, 21 and 22,
signed consent forms to participate in a new experiment,
the database administrator could create a separate group
for these four patients. The transitive access for this ex-
perimental group would be {11,12, 21, 22}. Anyone using
the account for the experimental group in the QBE in-
terface would get data for these patients and data for the
other patients in the CF and COPD clinics.
5. Taxonomy maintenance
Generating queries with the QBE interface is an ef-
fortless experience for would be users. Similarly, main-
taining access privileges is a simple task. A database
administrator has to create groups and assign every
patient to at least one group. In addition, database ad-
ministrators can create meta-groups by merging preex-
isting groups. This process can be repeated recursively
until the desired hierarchical security structure is cre-
ated. Once the security structure is in place, the database
administrator can begin the process of assigning users
access to individual groups. A user is granted access to a
group by creating a link from the users account number
to the groups account number in the taxonomy. The
entire security architecture is controlled by entries in a
single taxonomy.
Users can inadvertently receive information on pa-
tients that they otherwise would not have access to if
there were errors in the taxonomy. Database adminis-
trators have to make sure those patient identiﬁers, which
a user does not have access to, are not contained in the
transitive closure over the users identiﬁer. Similarly,
patient identiﬁers have to be assigned to the appropriate
group(s). Database administrators have to understand
the ramiﬁcations of assigning patients to multiple
groups. The transitive closure can be used to verify the
correctness of any hierarchical security structure.
6. Discussion
Creating a shared research database resource and a
QBE interface leads to a security problem that has to be
resolved. Logistically, a shared database resource is
ideal. Clinicians, statisticians, and research administra-
tors will have one source to extract information. The
QBE interface is ideal because it hides from the users the
details of the database design and allows them to focus
on the content of their queries. Although users can
create queries that access all tables in the shared data-
base, some information contained in the tables has to be
protected from users who do not have full access rights.
The hierarchical security module presented in this article
oﬀers a ﬂexible solution to this problem. Database ad-
ministrators can create taxonomies that reﬂect elaborate
access rights to patient data. The security module works
seamlessly with QBE interface thus allowing all users to
generate queries with the same interface. Furthermore,
two users with diﬀerent access rights can submit the
same query and get diﬀerent results. The QBE interface
combined with the hierarchical security module forms
the foundation of an information system that is easy to
use and that appropriately protects information.
The QBE interface has been used by fellows in the
Pulmonary department and has been well received.
However, more extensive use is needed to fully evaluate
this approach to data access.
7. Conclusion
Database administrators can grant access to and pro-
tect patient information in a shared database resource by
using a QBE interface that has an embedded security
module. The security module can be implemented using a
hierarchical methodology that aggregates individual pa-
tient identiﬁers into groups to which users are granted
access. A QBE interface will allow users to express a wide
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variety of queries while the hierarchical security module
limits access to information.
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